“No Guns Allowed” – Court Says You Can’t Carry on Public Transit

Caitlyn Rosen of Courthouse News Service reports that a Seventh Circuit panel has reinstated Illinois’ prohibition on carrying firearms aboard public transportation, reversing a 2024 district court ruling that struck the law down. The panel – authored by U.S. Circuit Judge Joshua Kolar and joined by Judges Amy St. Eve and Kenneth Ripple – held that the state’s restrictions comport with Bruen’s “history and tradition” test when viewed through the lens of “sensitive places.” In short: buses, trains, and subways can remain gun-free zones under Illinois law, so long as any guns onboard are unloaded and secured.

The Law Illinois Defended

As Rosen summarizes, Illinois requires a Firearm Owner’s Identification (FOID) card to possess guns and a separate license to carry concealed. In 2022, four men challenged a specific provision that bars carrying on public transit. The statute does include a transport exception, unloaded firearms secured in baggage or otherwise inaccessible, yet the plaintiffs argued that the ban on carrying for self-defense violates the Second Amendment. A trial judge initially agreed. The Seventh Circuit did not.

Bruen, But Through A “Wide Lens”

Rosen notes that Judge Kolar leaned into Bruen’s analogical method, emphasizing courts should compare regulations, not merely locations. The focus, he wrote, is on “how and why” the government restricted arms in particular settings. Under that approach, “sensitive places” are those where crowding, confinement, or special vulnerabilities change the risk calculus – and where temporary, narrowly targeted restrictions have historical echoes.

The State’s Pitch: Transit Is A Sensitive Place

During argument, Illinois Deputy Solicitor General Alex Hemmer framed buses and trains as modern kin to historically regulated venues: crowded, government-operated, and populated by vulnerable riders. As Rosen recounts, Hemmer pointed to 19th-century rules on passenger railroads and other site-specific weapon restrictions as the sort of tradition Bruen allows. In that telling, transit systems fit comfortably within the “sensitive places” doctrine.

The Counter: Private Railroad Rules Aren’t Public Law

Plaintiffs’ counsel John Ohlendorf, according to Rosen’s reporting, pushed back that many 19th-century prohibitions lived in private rulebooks, not public statutes – akin to a homeowner’s house rules, not state law. If the historical pedigree is mostly private conduct, he argued, it should not empower the government to impose blanket bans today. That distinction – private control versus state coercion – matters a lot in Second Amendment cases.

The Panel’s Analogy – From Depot To Jetway

Judge Kolar ultimately sided with the state, stressing that Bruen does not demand a “strict similarity” between then and now. He even drew an analogy to federal airline rules: modern law permits transporting unloaded, inaccessible firearms in checked baggage – very close to Illinois’ transit carve-out. The court, Rosen writes, described an “unbroken chain” of regulations targeting “crowded and confined spaces,” and placed public transit on that spectrum.

What The Decision Actually Does

Rosen’s story makes clear this is not a total prohibition on firearms touching transit. The ban applies while riding and includes an exception for secured, unloaded guns. But for concealed-carry licensees who rely on trains or buses in places like Chicago, the practical effect is stark: no carrying for self-defense from the moment you step into the system until you step out. The Seventh Circuit cautioned against overreading the opinion as a new generic test, but the holding gives states a roadmap to designate transit as “sensitive.”

A Pro-2A Critique: “Activist Judges” And Stretched History

Gun-rights commentator Jared Yanis of Guns & Gadgets blasted the ruling as a “serious infringement” that leaves working people disarmed in some of the most crime-prone spaces in America. In his video, Yanis argues that calling transit “sensitive” because it is crowded flips Bruen on its head: the court acknowledges “heightened risk,” then disables only the law-abiding. He also criticizes reliance on ancient English restrictions and scattered 19th-century American venue bans (ballrooms, theaters) as cherry-picked analogies that dilute the Second Amendment’s core.

Penalties And Practical Risks, As Critics See Them

Yanis warns Illinois riders that carrying on transit could mean arrest, fines, and potential jail time; he cites first-offense exposure of up to six months and a $1,500 fine, with harsher penalties for repeats. Beyond legal risks, his view is that bans do nothing to deter criminals who already ignore laws, especially on large systems like the Chicago Transit Authority, leaving lawful riders “sitting ducks” during robberies or assaults. Whether one shares his tone or not, the safety vs. self-defense tension on transit is real and won’t vanish with a citation to Bruen.

Is There A Circuit Split Brewing?

Yanis also points to recent Ninth Circuit treatment of a California public-transit gun ban and says that court signaled likely unconstitutionality in part because there was no exception for unloaded storage – an exception Illinois has. If other circuits reject broad “transit-is-sensitive” theories, the Supreme Court could eventually be asked to referee. For now, the Seventh Circuit’s opinion supplies a detailed blueprint for states defending transit restrictions, while critics will scour the record for limiting principles.

The Hard Problem Of “Sensitive Places”

Rosen’s reporting captures the Seventh Circuit’s core move: treat “sensitive places” as a functional category tied to risk, not a frozen list of buildings named in 1791. That’s intellectually honest about modern realities (airplanes did not exist at the Founding). Still, Yanis’ warning has teeth: if “crowded and confined” becomes the standard, where does it stop – stadiums, shopping malls, sidewalks at rush hour? The more elastic the category, the easier it is for governments to erase carry rights wherever daily life gathers. Courts need guardrails that keep “sensitive” truly exceptional, not a shortcut for blanket bans.

The Equity Question States Rarely Answer

Even if we accept transit as unusually risky, states rarely grapple with the equity impact of disarmament. Wealthier residents who drive everywhere keep their carry privileges from driveway to destination. Lower-income residents who ride transit surrender self-defense the moment they tap their card. That asymmetry is difficult to square with a right guaranteed to “the people,” and it deserves more attention than it gets in doctrinal skirmishes over analogies to ballrooms and polling places.

What To Watch Next

Rosen notes Judge Kolar’s caution that the opinion shouldn’t be stretched beyond reason. Expect litigants to test that boundary – challenging any attempt to export “transit” logic to ride-share pickups, stations, parking lots, or even adjacent sidewalks. On the other side, watch for states to tighten their statutes to mirror Illinois’ “unloaded and secured” exception (and the airline analogy) to shore up their chances under Bruen. If other circuits diverge, the high court may eventually decide whether public transit is a bona fide “sensitive place” or an overbroad label swallowing the right to bear arms where many Americans live and work.

Bottom Line

Per Caitlyn Rosen’s detailed account, the Seventh Circuit says Illinois can forbid carrying guns on public transit while allowing unloaded, inaccessible transport – an approach the panel analogizes to historical venue rules and modern airline practice. Per Jared Yanis’ critique, that logic disarms only the rule-followers in places where danger is highest, relying on selective history to justify modern infringements. 

My view: courts should demand concrete limiting principles for “sensitive places” and confront the unequal burden transit bans place on those who can’t simply opt out of public transportation. Until then, in Illinois at least, the sign on the bus door effectively reads: No Guns Allowed.