McDonald’s built one of the most powerful restaurant businesses in history by making fast food affordable, predictable, and widely available, but business YouTuber Michael Girdley says the company’s U.S. operation has drifted so far from that original promise that many of its most important customers are now pulling back.
In a recent breakdown, Girdley argued that McDonald’s is not collapsing in the way weaker fast-food chains sometimes do, because its global reach, real estate holdings, franchise structure, and loyalty program still give it enormous financial strength. The deeper problem, he said, is that the company allowed prices to rise until McDonald’s no longer felt like an easy everyday meal for lower- and middle-income families, while still failing to offer the quality or experience people expect from a true premium restaurant.
That left the brand trapped in an uncomfortable middle ground, where customers increasingly compare an expensive McDonald’s order with a slightly higher-priced meal from Chipotle, Shake Shack, or another fast-casual chain and decide the difference in value is no longer large enough.
McDonald’s Was Built Around Affordable Food
Girdley traced the company’s strength back to its original purpose, explaining that McDonald’s became dominant because families knew they could get a quick, dependable meal without spending much money.
Ray Kroc expanded the concept after buying out the McDonald brothers, but the business became unusually powerful because of a model developed around land ownership and franchising. McDonald’s acquired or controlled much of the real estate beneath its restaurants, then collected rent and royalties from local operators who carried much of the day-to-day business risk.
Girdley described the company as a real estate business disguised as a burger chain, a familiar summary that helps explain why McDonald’s has remained so durable even during periods of weak restaurant performance.
For decades, the system worked because corporate leadership, franchisees, and customers all benefited from the same basic arrangement. Operators made money selling large volumes of inexpensive food, McDonald’s collected rent and royalties, and customers trusted that the menu would remain within reach.
That trust became one of the company’s most valuable assets, even though it did not appear directly on a balance sheet.
The Company Has Repeatedly Lost Its Way
According to Girdley, McDonald’s has gone through a recurring cycle in which leadership chases growth, expands the menu, allows service to decline, and raises prices until customers begin leaving.
When the company posted its first quarterly loss in 2002, it responded by returning to simpler operations and stronger value, including the dollar menu. That turnaround restored traffic and helped produce one of the most successful recoveries in restaurant history.
A similar problem emerged again in the 2010s as younger customers began gravitating toward chains such as Chipotle and Panera, which offered food that seemed fresher and more customizable.
Girdley said McDonald’s once again responded by simplifying, improving operations, and creating reasons for customers to return, including all-day breakfast.
The pattern matters because it suggests the present slowdown is not entirely new. What is different this time is the pressure created by the company’s heavily franchised structure, rising labor and food costs, and the growing distance between corporate profitability and the economics faced by individual restaurant owners.
Franchisees Carried More Risk as Costs Rose
Former CEO Steve Easterbrook accelerated McDonald’s refranchising strategy, moving most company-operated stores into the hands of local franchisees while returning large sums to shareholders through dividends and stock buybacks.
Girdley argued that this made McDonald’s corporate operation more profitable and less exposed to restaurant-level risk, but it also left franchisees responsible for labor, ingredients, maintenance, regulation, and other rising expenses.
McDonald’s still benefited from rent and royalty payments, while local owners had to protect thinner operating margins and, in many cases, personally guaranteed loans tied to their restaurants.
When costs surged during and after the pandemic, those operators had few realistic options other than raising menu prices.
Although McDonald’s corporate does not directly set every local price, Girdley noted that customers do not distinguish between the corporation and the franchisee when they see a costly Big Mac meal. They simply conclude that McDonald’s has become expensive.
That distinction may matter legally and financially, but it means almost nothing to someone standing at the counter or checking a delivery app.
Higher Prices Broke the Brand Promise
Girdley said the biggest damage came from the loss of McDonald’s traditional value identity.
A Big Mac meal that once cost around $7 or $8 in some markets could later approach $13, $15, or even more, while isolated examples of much higher prices spread rapidly online.
Those viral receipts became symbols of a broader frustration, particularly among younger consumers who were quick to publicize what they saw as unreasonable menu inflation.
McDonald’s had spent decades teaching customers that it was the place to go when a family needed an affordable, convenient meal. Once that expectation was broken, the company could not simply defend itself by pointing to local franchise pricing or higher operating costs.
Girdley said customers earning less than roughly $45,000 a year, historically among the company’s most important groups, began cutting back sharply.
That is a serious warning for any mass-market business. When a company loses the customers who defined its original purpose, the problem is deeper than one weak quarter or one poorly received product launch.
McDonald’s Became Too Expensive for Everyday Use
Girdley described McDonald’s as entering a “dead zone” in which it was no longer cheap enough to be a routine purchase but not distinctive enough to feel like a worthwhile splurge.
A customer deciding between an $11 McDonald’s order and a $12 meal from Chipotle may reasonably choose the option that feels fresher, larger, or more satisfying.
Chicken chains also gained strength as consumers increasingly favored restaurants such as Chick-fil-A and Raising Cane’s, while beef became more expensive and harder for McDonald’s to price competitively.
At the same time, more people began cooking at home, working remotely, and making fewer commutes, reducing the number of routine occasions when someone might stop for breakfast, a milkshake, or a quick meal.
Delivery services made the value problem worse by adding substantial markups, even though customers often blamed McDonald’s rather than the delivery platform for the final price.
The combined effect was not that everyone suddenly stopped eating at McDonald’s, but that the brand became easier to skip.
New Consumer Habits Added More Pressure
Girdley also pointed to changing health habits, including the rise of GLP-1 medications such as Ozempic and Wegovy, which can reduce appetite and weaken cravings for high-calorie, high-fat, and salty foods.
Those medications do not explain McDonald’s broader pricing problem, but they add another challenge for a business whose menu is designed around indulgence and convenience.
He argued that the company is being squeezed from several directions at once: lower-income customers are cutting back because prices rose, some higher-income customers are choosing better fast-casual options, and people using appetite-suppressing drugs may simply want less of the food McDonald’s sells.
This does not mean burgers and fries are disappearing, but it does make McDonald’s old formula less automatic than it once was.
A company that could previously depend on habit must now work harder to justify each visit.
The $5 Meal Deal Was an Admission
McDonald’s eventually responded by introducing a $5 meal deal that bundled a drink, fries, nuggets, and either a McChicken or McDouble.
Girdley viewed the promotion as another return to the company’s founding promise, after leadership once again allowed prices and positioning to move too far from what customers expected.
The deal reportedly helped bring lower-income customers back, suggesting that the appetite for McDonald’s had not disappeared so much as the sense of value had.
That is an important distinction. Customers were not necessarily rejecting the brand itself; many were rejecting the price attached to it.
The challenge is that franchisees must still absorb much of the cost of discounting, so corporate leadership cannot simply announce permanent value without finding a way to make the economics work at the restaurant level.
McDonald’s therefore faces a structural problem as well as a marketing one. It needs affordable prices to rebuild trust, but local operators need enough margin to remain viable.
McDonald’s Still Has Powerful Advantages
Despite the title of his report, Girdley did not suggest that McDonald’s is on the verge of disappearing.
The company owns or controls enormous amounts of valuable real estate, earns much of its operating profit outside the United States, and has a loyalty program that encourages frequent repeat visits.
Those advantages provide resilience that many rivals do not have.
McDonald’s can survive strategic mistakes, weak U.S. traffic, and temporary consumer pullbacks because its business is broader than the sale of individual hamburgers.
Its international operations also reduce its dependence on the American customer, while the real estate portfolio gives it financial strength that chains such as Burger King or Wendy’s cannot easily match.
The problem is therefore not survival, but relevance.
McDonald’s can remain profitable while still losing cultural and economic ground in the market that made it famous.
The Company Must Rebuild Trust Around Value
Girdley’s central argument was that McDonald’s became vulnerable because it forgot the reason customers trusted it in the first place.
The company was never primarily about gourmet food or premium dining. Its strength came from offering something familiar, quick, and affordable enough that families did not need to debate the purchase.
Once a routine meal began to feel like a luxury, customers naturally reconsidered where else their money might go.
McDonald’s still has the scale, capital, real estate, and brand recognition to recover, but doing so will require more than temporary promotions or another viral menu launch. It will need a lasting value strategy that works for customers and franchisees at the same time.
The lesson from Girdley’s report is not that nobody literally eats at McDonald’s anymore, but that fewer people now see it as the automatic choice it once was. For a company built on habit, convenience, and affordability, losing that automatic trust may be the most important warning of all.
Gary’s love for adventure and preparedness stems from his background as a former Army medic. Having served in remote locations around the world, he knows the importance of being ready for any situation, whether in the wilderness or urban environments. Gary’s practical medical expertise blends with his passion for outdoor survival, making him an expert in both emergency medical care and rugged, off-the-grid living. He writes to equip readers with the skills needed to stay safe and resilient in any scenario.
