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The A-10 Warthog handled business and solved what the US Navy couldn’t at Hormuz

Image Credit: Navy Decoded

The A 10 Warthog handled business and solved what the US Navy couldn't at Hormuz
Image Credit: Navy Decoded

When Air Force Times reporter Michael Scanlon wrote that the A-10 Warthog had been pulled into maritime interdiction missions in the Strait of Hormuz, it landed like a jolt. This was not the airplane most people expected to hear about in a sea fight.

But according to Scanlon, that is exactly what happened. During a Pentagon briefing, Joint Chiefs Chairman Gen. Dan Caine said the A-10 was now operating along the southern flank of Operation Epic Fury, targeting Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps fast-attack watercraft in the Strait of Hormuz.

That detail matters because it confirms something the host of the YouTube channel Navy Decoded had been arguing from a different angle: the problem in Hormuz was not just about firepower. It was about having the right kind of firepower.

The Navy, in that telling, was smashing larger and more expensive targets just fine. What it struggled with was the messy, crowded, close-range swarm threat that lives in a narrow shipping corridor and refuses to play by blue-water rules.

A Narrow Strait Became A Brutal Math Problem

The Navy Decoded host framed the whole issue in terms that were hard to ignore. He said the United States had destroyed or disabled 120 Iranian vessels, deployed two carrier strike groups, and brought enormous naval power to the region, yet the strait still remained shut and commercial traffic was still being choked off.

His point was not that the Navy failed to fight. It was that the Navy’s tools were built for a different class of battle.

A Narrow Strait Became A Brutal Math Problem
Image Credit: Navy Decoded

In the video, the host described the Strait of Hormuz as only 21 nautical miles wide at its narrowest point, but said the actual shipping lane is much tighter than that, just six nautical miles of usable corridor once inbound and outbound channels and a buffer are taken into account.

Inside that cramped space, he said, Iran’s fast-attack craft posed a very different challenge from frigates, destroyers, or larger surface ships.

These were not the kind of targets that justify million-dollar answers every time. The Navy Decoded host described them as small, fast, low to the water, and numerous enough to turn the fight into an ugly numbers game.

That is what makes this story so interesting. It was not really about whether American naval power was bigger, stronger, or more advanced. It was about whether all that sophistication matched the problem in front of it.

Why Cheap Boats Can Create An Expensive Headache

According to the Navy Decoded host, Iran’s swarm doctrine is built around cost imbalance.

He said the Revolutionary Guard Navy operates more than 1,500 fast-attack craft, many of them relatively cheap compared with the missiles and systems used to stop them. In his breakdown, an SM-6 interceptor costs about $5.3 million, while some of the speedboats it might be fired at cost a tiny fraction of that.

That is the trap.

As the host explained it, destroyers and carrier groups are packed with impressive weapons, but many of those weapons were designed for open-water, high-value threats. In a narrow channel filled with civilian traffic, small fast boats, and confusion, that becomes a much clumsier fit.

He also argued that the Navy’s other tools each came with limits. The Mark 45 deck gun could not keep up with swarm volume. The Phalanx system burns through ammunition quickly. The F/A-18 flies too fast and spends less time on station than this kind of mission demands. The MH-60R Seahawk can identify and strike small craft, but in the host’s words, it is more scalpel than chainsaw.

That comparison may sound dramatic, but it captures the central point well.

This was not a complaint that the Navy lacked weapons. It was a complaint that it lacked the most economical and persistent weapon for this exact fight.

Why The A-10 Fit The Mission Better Than Anyone Expected

That is where Scanlon’s reporting and the Navy Decoded argument begin to line up.

Scanlon noted that the A-10 was designed for close air support and built to fly low, slow, and close to the fight. He also pointed out the features that have made the aircraft famous for decades: the titanium-armored cockpit, redundant flight systems, and the ability to take punishment and keep flying.

Why The A 10 Fit The Mission Better Than Anyone Expected
Image Credit: Navy Decoded

In a maritime setting, those traits suddenly look less like Cold War leftovers and more like practical answers.

The Air Force Times report highlighted the A-10’s 30mm GAU-8/A Avenger cannon, AGM-65 Maverick missiles, and APKWS laser-guided rockets as weapons that can engage the small, agile surface craft Iran has long used to threaten shipping in the strait. Scanlon also stressed the Warthog’s ability to loiter, which lets crews maintain persistent overwatch in a way faster aircraft cannot.

The Navy Decoded host took that same idea and pushed it further.

He argued that the A-10’s cannon changes the economics of engagement in a dramatic way. In his telling, a short burst of 30mm fire against a fiberglass fast boat costs a tiny fraction of what a missile shot from a destroyer might cost. He described that not as a minor improvement, but as a total shift in the math.

That is the key word here: math.

The host kept returning to numbers because the fight in Hormuz, at least as he described it, is partly an engineering problem. How do you stay over the target area long enough, identify the right boat, kill it cheaply, and still absorb return fire if things get ugly?

The Warthog, improbable as it may sound in a naval story, answers most of those questions surprisingly well.

Low, Slow, Tough, And Built Around A Gun

The host of Navy Decoded made a strong case that the A-10’s supposed weaknesses are exactly what made it useful here.

He noted that the aircraft’s lower speed gives pilots more time to visually sort targets in a crowded corridor. That matters in a place where military boats may be moving among civilian vessels and where mistakes would carry enormous consequences.

Low, Slow, Tough, And Built Around A Gun
Image Credit: Navy Decoded

He also argued that the aircraft’s straight-wing design, stable gun platform, and long time on station make it especially suited to repetitive patrol loops over a narrow strip of water.

Then there is survivability.

Scanlon wrote that the A-10’s hardened cockpit and redundant systems give it a toughness that many aircraft do not have. The Navy Decoded host leaned heavily into that point, saying the Warthog can take the kind of punishment that would make other platforms far less comfortable operating low and close.

That is one of the more fascinating parts of this whole story. For years, the A-10 has often been described as old, vulnerable, and headed for retirement. Yet in this case, its age seems almost beside the point.

What mattered was that the plane was built for ugly work, and Hormuz sounds like ugly work.

The Navy Did Not Fail. The Mission Changed

It is important not to twist the story into something it is not.

The host of Navy Decoded explicitly said the issue was not that the Navy was weak. His argument was that the Navy was engineered for blue-water warfare: long range, open ocean, expensive missiles, and high-value targets.

Hormuz, by contrast, is a brown-water knife fight inside a shipping bottleneck.

That distinction is important, and frankly it is one of the smartest parts of the whole discussion. It is easy to treat every military problem as a contest of who has the better technology, but warfare is often more embarrassing than that. Sometimes the winning side is simply the one that brings the right wrench instead of the fanciest machine.

The Navy Did Not Fail. The Mission Changed
Image Credit: Navy Decoded

Scanlon’s reporting also makes clear that the A-10 is not operating alone.

He quoted Caine announcing the Warthog’s role in the strait, and he noted that CENTCOM had already shown A-10Cs supporting the operation. He also cited CENTCOM commander Adm. Brad Cooper, who said U.S. forces had destroyed more than 100 Iranian naval vessels and would continue to deplete Iran’s ability to threaten freedom of navigation in and around Hormuz.

That broader campaign matters because it shows the A-10 is part of a larger effort, not some lone hero flying in to save the day.

Even the Navy Decoded host framed the answer as a combined-arms solution. In his version, the A-10, Army Apaches, and Navy surface forces each cover gaps the others cannot fill. The Warthog handles cheap swarm targets more efficiently, helicopters work closer in, and the Navy preserves its high-end missiles for the threats only those systems can stop.

That sounds less like interservice rivalry and more like a harsh lesson in specialization.

The Warthog’s Value Just Got Harder To Ignore

Scanlon noted that Congress has already stepped in to slow Air Force divestment of the A-10, with the Fiscal Year 2026 National Defense Authorization Act blocking the service from shrinking the fleet below 103 aircraft through late September 2026.

That does not mean the Warthog is safe forever.

The Navy Decoded host ended by asking the obvious next question: if the A-10 eventually leaves, what replaces it in a mission like this? A drone? A maritime interdiction aircraft built for brown-water combat? Some Navy-designed answer that does not yet exist?

That is not a small question.

The A-10’s role in Hormuz, as described by Michael Scanlon and the Navy Decoded host, does more than give the old jet another victory lap. It exposes a gap. It suggests that for all the Pentagon’s talk about modernity, there are still fights where simple persistence, brutal efficiency, and the right gun matter more than sleek design and big price tags.

And that may be the most telling part of all.

The Warthog was never supposed to be the star of a naval bottleneck fight. Yet here it is, flying into one of the world’s most important shipping lanes and solving a problem that bigger, faster, and more expensive systems were not built to solve in the same way.

That is not nostalgia talking. It is a reminder that in war, the right tool often looks obvious only after it starts working.

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Image Credit: Max Velocity - Severe Weather Center